In the first quarter of 2025, Kenya's development sector absorbed one of the most severe funding shocks in its history. The Trump administration's freeze of USAID programmes — which had committed approximately $470 million annually to Kenya, 80% of it in health — was sudden, sweeping, and devastating in its immediate effects.
By June 2025, an estimated 41,500 health workers — representing 18% of Kenya's total health workforce — had seen their USAID-supported positions at risk. Food rations for 720,000 refugees dropped to 28% of the standard allocation. Eighty-one organisations globally had closed at least one office. World Vision lost 10% of its global budget and laid off approximately 3,000 staff.
But here is what makes this moment structurally different from past aid disruptions: it is not just USAID. The Netherlands cut its development cooperation by 60%. Germany reduced by 53%. The United Kingdom trimmed its aid spending to its lowest share of national income since 1999. Finland, Sweden, and others have followed. By mid-2025, less than 17% of the $46 billion needed for global humanitarian work had been funded — a 40% drop year-on-year.
This is not a funding dip. It is a structural reset. The question for every development organisation in Kenya and East Africa is not whether the old funding model will return. It is how to build organisations that can deliver impact without depending on it.
Many organisations are in a holding pattern — reducing operations, maintaining relationships with remaining donors, and hoping for a change in the political winds. That is understandable. It is not sufficient.
The political dynamics driving these cuts are deeply embedded. In the United States, foreign aid has become a domestic political symbol. In Europe, fiscal pressures, domestic political shifts, and declining public support for overseas development are structural trends, not temporary reactions. Even if any single government reverses course, the aggregate funding environment will not return to 2020 levels within the planning horizon of most organisations.
Organisations that treat this as a temporary gap to be bridged will exhaust reserves, reduce programming, and potentially close. Organisations that treat it as a permanent structural shift requiring a fundamental response will build something more resilient.
The evidence from organisations navigating this crisis points to three viable paths, which are not mutually exclusive:
The first response is the hardest: decide what you exist to do, cut everything else, and do that thing exceptionally well with the resources you have. This means programme portfolio rationalisation — a process of honest, evidence-based assessment of which programmes are delivering the highest impact per shilling, and making the genuinely difficult decision to stop the rest.
This is not simply about cutting costs. It is about preserving organisational identity and impact at a sustainable scale. An organisation that tries to do everything at 50% funding will do everything badly. An organisation that does its three most important things at 100% will retain credibility, staff quality, and donor confidence.
The second strategy is to reduce dependence on any single donor category. For most Kenyan development organisations, the portfolio has been heavily weighted toward U.S. bilateral, European bilateral, and UN system funding. Diversification means building new revenue streams:
The third strategy is the one most discussed and least well executed: localisation. International NGOs are under pressure from both donors and host governments to transfer leadership, assets, and decision-making authority to local entities.
Done performatively — rebranding, changing leadership titles, holding assets in a local entity name — localisation creates liability without building capability. Done genuinely, it represents the most important structural change a development organisation can make.
Genuine localisation requires: building local leadership capacity deliberately (not just promoting staff but developing their strategic, financial, and governance capabilities), strengthening local board governance, transferring institutional knowledge systematically, and restructuring the relationship with the international organisation so the local entity has real authority, not just nominal independence.
Across all three strategies, the enabling factor is governance. Boards of development organisations have historically been constituted for compliance and oversight — ensuring donor conditions are met, financial controls are in place, and programmes are delivered according to plan. That is necessary but insufficient for a crisis of this scale.
Boards of development organisations today need to be active participants in resource mobilisation strategy. They need members with networks into the private sector, government, and alternative funders. They need strategic finance capability to evaluate blended finance structures. And they need the courage to make the genuinely hard decisions about programme rationalisation that staff leadership often cannot.
If your board does not have these capabilities, building them is an urgent governance priority — not a nice-to-have for the next AGM.
For organisations ready to act, here is a starting framework:
The organisations that will be standing in five years are not the ones that were best funded in 2020. They are the ones that adapted fastest, made the hardest decisions earliest, and built the institutional muscle to deliver impact regardless of who is in the White House.